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Thomas Pink on “official theology” (Updated)

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At the National Catholic Register, Edward Pentin recently interviewed philosopher Thomas Pink on the subject of the failure of the Church’s leaders to teach and defend her doctrines.  (The interview is in two parts, hereand here.)  Pink is interesting and insightful as always, and in general I agree with the substance of his analysis.  However, it seems to me that the way he expresses his main point is potentially misleading and could needlessly open him up to unfair criticism.
 
Pink draws a distinction between the “magisterial teaching” of the Church and what he calls the “official theology” of churchmen.  The problem with many current leaders in the Church, in Pink’s view, is that their official theology effectively smothers magisterial teaching without explicitly contradicting it.  Explaining what he means by “official theology,” he says:

They are statements that are official – made by officeholders in their public role – but they simply explain what the magisterial teaching means, or what the Church’s policies and practices are, without those statements of themselves imposing any obligation on our part to believe them.

End quote.  Now, it’s this expression “official theology” and Pink’s gloss on it here that I find problematic.  Again, I don’t disagree with the substance of what Pink is saying.  I think his main point is absolutely correct and important.  But the literal meaning of the expression “official theology” might lead an unsympathetic reader wrongly to accuse Pink of drawing a distinction without a difference, with a view to rationalizing a rejection of doctrines he doesn’t like.  

After all, what Pink calls “magisterial teaching” is also theological in content, and it is put forward officially insofar as it is to be found in authoritative documents such as the decrees of Church councils, papal encyclicals, instructions issued by the CDF, and so forth.  So isn’t magisterial teaching itself a kind of “official theology”?  Furthermore, doesn’t the Church tell us that it is the job of popes and bishops to “explain what the magisterial teaching means,” and that the faithful are obliged to give religious submission of intellect and will to this teaching (even if, as I have explained elsewhere, the Church allows that there can be circumstances in which such submission may legitimately be withheld)?  So, when churchmen acting “in their public role” rather than as private theologians “simply explain what the magisterial teaching means,or what the Church’s policies and practices are” isn’t there at least a presumption that Catholics do have an “obligation… to believe them”?

So, again, if you go just by the literal meaning of the expression “official theology” and the explanatory remark from Pink quoted above, it may seem that he hasn’t made it clear either how this is distinct from “magisterial teaching,” or why Catholics are not obligated to accept the former despite being obligated to accept the latter.

However, when you look at the specific examplesPink discusses, his meaning is clear.  For instance, he says:

Official theology often changes over time, and not in a constant direction.  The to-ing and fro-ing over unbaptised children [the doctrine on limbo] shows that the official theology of one time can contradict the official theology of another time.  And if past official theology of the Church can be mistaken, so too can modern official theology. 

End quote.  Another example Pink discusses at greater length is Jacques Maritain’s political theology of democratic pluralism, which has never been magisterial teaching but has nevertheless had an enormous influence on how contemporary Catholic theologians think about matters of Church and state.  An example Pink does not give but which is another instance of the sort of thing he has in mind is Hans Urs von Balthasar’s view that there is a realistic hope that all human beings will be saved. 

Other examples could be given, but these three – the rejection of the idea of limbo, the affirmation of the pluralistic non-confessional state as a positive good, and the “empty hell” hypothesis – provide a representative sample.  Here are three observations about them.  First, and again, none of these ideas is magisterial teaching, and no Catholic is obligated to agree with them.  

Second, these ideas are nevertheless widespread even among contemporary Catholic churchmen and theologians who have reputations for orthodoxy, and they reflect more general theological tendencies that are even more widespread.  For example, Maritain’s position reflects the influence of modern personalist philosophy, and personalism was also a major influence on the thinking of Pope St. John Paul II.  Von Balthasar was a major figure within the nouvelle théologie or resourcement movementin twentieth-century Catholic theology, and Pope Benedict XVI was another major figure in that movement.  No Catholic is obligated to endorse either personalism or the nouvelle théologie, but the fact that two popes widely admired among faithful Catholics were influenced by these movements has given them enormous prestige and influence within Catholicism. 

As I say, I think it would be misleading to call either these general movements or the specific theological ideas referred to parts of an “official theology.”  But they might plausibly be regarded as parts of a “dominant theology” or a “prevailing theology,” which I think would be better labels than the one Pink uses.

A third observation is that these three specific examples of prevailing theological ideas – again, the rejection of limbo, the affirmation of the non-confessional state as a positive good, and the “empty hell” hypothesis – all reflect a kind of optimism about the human condition that is novel, and indeed foreign to the Catholic tradition.  Magisterial Catholic teaching holds that without baptism we cannot be cleansed of the stain of original sin, and without sacramental confession we cannot be cleansed of the stain of mortal sin committed after baptism.  Thus, without baptism and confession we cannot be saved.  Hence the urgency of the Great Commission.  Now, it is true that there are qualifications to be made to these doctrines, having to do with the notions of baptism of desire, invincible ignorance, and the like.  But to think that this makes the need for baptism and confession less urgent is somewhat like thinking that a diagnosis of cancer needn’t prompt urgent action, since there are rare cases where cancers disappear without treatment; or like thinking that to prepare to have a large family and put the kids through college, it will suffice to buy a few lottery tickets.

Now, the rejection of limbo is hard to square with the urgency of infant baptism, and the “empty hell” hypothesis is hard to square with the urgency of conversion, of repentance, and of confession of mortal sin.  Celebration of the pluralistic non-confessional state as a positive good (as opposed to a necessary evil) is also in tension with this urgency.  If conversion is an urgent matter, then it can hardly fail to be an urgent matter to dispel theological error.  But if religious pluralism is a positively good thing, then it is hard to see how dispelling theological error can be an urgent matter, and thus hard to see how conversion can be an urgent matter either.  It is no surprise that latitudinarianism in theology and pluralism as a political ideal tend to go hand in hand.  (The connection goes back to the beginning of the liberal tradition, as I discuss in my book on John Locke.)

These novel theological opinions are often formulated in a way that attempts to make them consistent with the letter of Catholic magisterial teaching.  That is, for example, why “empty hell” theorists don’t deny either that hell exists or that some people might in theory end up there, but confine themselves to arguing that there is at least good reason to think that perhaps few if any in fact do.  I think these attempts at harmonization with past teaching are dubious at best.  (Pink has written much on the problems facing attempts to harmonize the affirmation of the non-confessional state as a positive good with traditional Catholic teaching, most recently at Public Discourse.  See the articles linked to above for discussion of limbo and the “empty hell” hypothesis.)  But even if these novel theories could be made consistent with the letter of traditional Catholic doctrine, they are manifestly in conflict with its spirit.  

Pink’s main point is that it is precisely because such theological opinions are at the very least in conflict with the spirit of traditional Catholic teaching that many churchmen beholden to these opinions do not proclaim and defend that teaching.  Why bother preaching the urgent need for conversion and baptism, or the urgency of repenting of and confessing mortal sins (such as the variety of sexual sins that are today not only widely indulged in but widely celebrated), if most people are going to be saved anyway?  Especially when doing so will only bring down upon you the opprobrium of the dominant secular liberal culture?  

In this way, the “official theology” (or better, the “prevailing theology” or “dominant theology”) makes magisterial teaching of no effect, without explicitly denying it.  And part of the remedy, as Pink goes on to argue, is for Catholic scholars to criticizethis prevailing theology – to show how it not only differs from actual magisterial teaching, but either explicitly or at least implicitly and in practice conflicts with it.  To carry out such criticism is in no way to be disloyal to the Church or her leaders.  On the contrary, it is precisely to defend the Church’s magisterial teaching and to assist her leaders in doing the same.  (It is also to exercise a right and duty that the Church herself recognizes.)

It seems to me that a helpful parallel here might be drawn with a distinction made in the philosophy of science.  In his recent book on quantum mechanics, Peter Lewis draws a distinction between (1) the phenomena a physical theory is meant to explain, (2) the theoryitself, and (3) alternative possible interpretationsof the theory.  In the case of quantum mechanics, the phenomena would include the interference phenomena of the two-slit experiment, and quantum entanglement phenomena.  The theory would include the mathematical representation of the physical systems central to quantum phenomena, and a law describing the changes of such systems over time.  The interpretations would include accounts of how the mathematical representation relates to concrete physical reality, such as the Copenhagen interpretation or the many worlds interpretation.

I would suggest that a parallel distinction can be drawn between (i) the data of divine revelation found in scripture and tradition, (ii) authoritative magisterial statements found in the decrees of councils, papal encyclicals, etc., and (iii) theological theories and systems that provide alternative interpretations of the sources of revelation and of magisterial statements.

Now, in the case of science, especially in popularized accounts, the distinction between (1) and (2) on the one hand and (3) on the other is often blurred.  For example, one sometimes hears sensationalistic claims to the effect that quantum mechanics has established the existence of parallel universes, or that it has vindicated the idealist view that physical reality depends on the observer.  In fact, quantum mechanics per se does not establish any such claims.  Rather, it is only certain interpretations of quantum mechanics – or even only certain extrapolations from certain interpretations of quantum mechanics – that make such claims, albeit they are interpretations and extrapolations that are sometimes endorsed by scientists.

Similarly, in Catholic contexts, the distinction between (i) and (ii) on the one hand and (iii) on the other is sometimes blurred.  For example, one sometimes hears claims to the effect that Catholic teaching no longer accepts the idea of limbo, or that it now requires that one affirm the non-confessional state as the ideal political arrangement.  In fact, Catholic magisterial teaching makes no such claims.  It is only certain theological theories that make such claims, albeit they are theories that are often endorsed by churchmen.  

What Pink is getting at, I would suggest, is precisely this point.  What he calls “official theology” is what I am referring to as category (iii) theological claims, or as examples of “prevailing theology” or “dominant theology.”   And he is right to say both that these ideas are not binding on the faithful, and that they often tend at least implicitly to undermine magisterial teaching and to discourage churchmen from proclaiming and defending it.

UPDATE 11/10: Pink's views are developed further in a recent three-part article at The Josias on the topic "Vatican II and Crisis in the Theology of Baptism": Part I, Part II, and Part III.

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