My article “Being, the Good, and the Guise of the Good” appears in the volume Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics, edited by Daniel D. Novotný and Lukáš Novák and forthcoming from Routledge. The other contributors to the volume are Jorge J. E. Gracia, William F. Vallicella, E. Jonathan Lowe, Gyula Klima, Michael Gorman, Michael J. Loux, David S. Oderberg, Edmund Runggaldier, Uwe Meixner, James Franklin, Robert Koons, William Lane Craig, and Nicholas Rescher.
Here’s the abstract of my paper:
This paper puts forward an exposition and defense of an Aristotelian-Scholastic conception of the good, and in particular of the theses that goodness is convertible with being and that all action is directed at the good. The former thesis will be defended against the objection, longstanding within modern philosophy, that there is a “fact/value dichotomy” such that any attempt to derive claims about goodness from claims about the existence and nature of things commits a “naturalistic fallacy.” The latter thesis will be defended against the recent criticisms of J. David Velleman. The application of the theses in question to the natural law approach to ethics and to natural theology will be noted in the course of the discussion.
